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Abstract: CAPTCHA (or Human Interaction Proof) is now almost a standard security 
technique for defending against undesirable or malicious bot programs on the Internet. 
However, the robustness of CAPTCHAs has so far been studied mainly just in 
communities such as computer vision, and document analysis and recognition. This 
paper motivates a security engineering perspective of the robustness of CAPTCHAs. 
Specifically, we show that a number of CAPTCHAs that appeared to be secure, including 
schemes widely deployed by Microsoft, Yahoo and Google and some other less well-
known ones, could be broken with a high success rate with simple but novel attacks. In 
contrast to earlier work that relied on sophisticated computer vision algorithms, our 
attacks exploited critical design errors that we discovered in each scheme. The main 
lesson is that security engineering expertise and experience, in particular adversarial 
thinking skills, can make a unique and significant contribution to the improvement of the 
robustness of CAPTCHAs. 
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1. Introduction   
A CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and 
Humans Apart) is a program that generates and grades tests that are human solvable, but 
intended to be beyond the capabilities of current computer programs [8]. This technology 
often makes use of a hard, open AI problem, and is now a common security mechanism 
for defending against undesirable or malicious Internet bot programs. It has found 
widespread application on numerous commercial web sites. For example, Google, 
Microsoft and Yahoo have all deployed their own CAPTCHAs for years to defend 
against email spam (by making it harder for spammers to harvest free email accounts). 
 
Moni Noar was in 1996 the first person who proposed to use automated Turing tests to 
verify that a human, rather than a bot, is in the loop [6]. Alta Vista patented a similar idea 
in 1998 (United States Patent 6195698). However, the term of CAPTCHA was coined in 
2000 by a team led by Manuel Blum and Luis von Ahn at Carnegie Mellon University, 
and the popularity of such technology was largely due to this team’s efforts. To date, the 
most widely used CAPTCHAs are the so-called text-based schemes, in which users are 
asked to recognize a distorted text, which is intended to be beyond the capabilities of the 
state of the art of pattern recognition programs. 
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The security of CAPTCHAs concerns a number of aspects. First, the role of a CAPTCHA 
is effectively the same as the following simple challenge-response protocol. 
 
Service ! Client: a CAPTCHA challenge 
Client ! Service: response 
 
Therefore, protocol-level attacks can be an issue. For example, a spammer could shift the 
load of solving CATPCHA challenges to porn site visitors, achieving an oracle attack. A 
spammer could also outsource the task of solving CAPTCHA challenges to people in 
low-paying countries. On the other hand, systems aspects of security also matter for 
CAPTCHAs. For example, some early CAPTCHAs could be bypassed simply by re-
using the session ID of a known challenge image [12]. However, all these are beyond the 
scope of this paper, which instead focuses on another aspect of CAPTCHA security, i.e. 
the robustness of CAPTCHAs, which is the strength of their resistance to computer 
programs that attackers write to automatically solve CAPTCHA tests.  
 
In this paper, we motivate a security engineering approach to the robustness of 
CAPTCHAs, a subject that has so far been studied mainly just in the computer vision and 
document analysis and recognition communities, as will be reviewed below. Our 
discussion will focus on text CAPTCHAs, but some lessons we have learned are also 
applicable to other types of CAPTCHAs.  
 
Specifically, we will examine a number of recent, representative text CAPTCHAs, 
including the schemes widely deployed by Microsoft, Yahoo and Google, as well as 
others that are less known. We show that although these schemes, as deployed in the 
period of 2006 - 2008, appeared to be secure, they could be broken - in the sense of 
writing computer programs that automatically solve CAPTCHA tests - with a high 
success rate using simple but novel attack strategies. In contrast to early work that relied 
on sophisticated algorithms, our attacks exploited fatal design errors that we discovered 
in each scheme.  
 
2. Related Work 
 
Specialised computer vision algorithms had some success for breaking some early text 
CAPTCHAs. For example, Mori and Malik [4] designed sophisticated object recognition 
algorithms to break the EZ-Gimpy (92% success) and the Gimpy (33% success) schemes, 
two early CAPTCHAs created by the CMU team. Moy et al [ 5] developed distortion 
estimation techniques to break EZ-Gimpy with a success rate of 99% and 4-letter Gimpy-
r with a success rate of 78%.  
 
Chellapilla and Simard [1] attacked a number of CAPTCHAs taken from the web using 
machine-learning algorithms (largely neural networks), achieving a success rate of from 
4.89% to 66.2%.  
 
Chellapilla and colleagues [2] argued that if the positions of characters are known in 
challenge images generated by a CAPTCHA, then breaking this scheme is just a pure 
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recognition problem, which is a trivial task with standard machine learning techniques 
such as neural networks. However, when the location of characters in a CAPTCHA 
challenge is not known a-priori, the state of the art (including machine learning) methods 
do not work well in locating the characters, let alone recognising them. In general, 
identifying character locations in the right order, or segmentation, is still an open problem, 
and it is computationally expensive, and often combinatorially hard [1].  
 
Therefore, it is suggested that the robustness of text-based schemes should rely on the 
difficulty of finding where each character is (segmentation), rather than which character 
it is (recognition) [7, 1, 2]. That is, CAPTCHAs should be segmentation-resistant. In 
other words, if a CAPTCHA can be successfully segmented, then this scheme is 
effectively broken. 
 
A common method to estimate the strength of a CAPTCHA is as follows. Denote by s the 
average percentage of challenges that can be entirely segmented correctly, and by r an 
individual character recognition rate that can be achieved. Then, the overall 
(segmentation and then recognition) success rate for breaking a scheme can be estimated 
by s*rn, where n is the average text length used in a scheme.  
 
Usability and robustness are two fundamental issues with CAPTCHAs, and they often 
interact with each other. In [11], we examined usability issues that should be considered 
and addressed in the design of CAPTCHAs, and discussed subtle implications that some 
of those issues can have on robustness.  
 
A commonly accepted goal for CAPTCHA design is that automated attacks should not 
achieve a success rate of higher than 0.01% for passing a CAPTCHA, but that the human 
success rate should be at least 90% [2].  
 
Some other related studies were surveyed in our recent work [9]. 
 
3. Captchaservice.org schemes: counting the number of pixels as an attack 
 
Captchaservice.org was a publicly available web service for the sole purpose of 
generating CAPTCHA challenges. The design of this service and various CAPTCHA 
schemes it supported were discussed in a recent paper by their designer [3]. We examined 
four of the CAPTCHA schemes provided by this service. A challenge example is shown 
in Fig 1(a) for each of the schemes.  
 
As deployed from 2006 to 2007, all the four schemes based their robustness on a 
technique of random-shearing distortion, which was applied to a challenge image both 
vertically and horizontally. Specifically, the distortion works as follows: “… the pixels in 
each column of the image are translated up or down by an amount that varies randomly 
yet smoothly from one column to the next. Then the same kind of translation is applied to 
each row of pixels (with a smaller amount of translation on average).” [3]. The main 
difference between these schemes was the alphabet used, as well as the length of text 
allowed in each challenge. For example, both the word_image and random_letters_image 
 4
schemes used capital letters only and the text length was six. The 
number_puzzle_text_image scheme used only numbers, which could be up to 7 digits. 
The user_string_image scheme was designed to accept any user-supplied string of at 
most 15 characters that consisted of digital, and capital and lower-case letters.  
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Fig 1. Four captchaservice.org schemes.  
(a) An example challenge for each of the schemes (clockwise: word_image,
random_letters_image, user_string_image, number_puzzle_text_image). These schemes used 
the same distortion technique, but could differ in alphabet sets and text lengths allowed. 
Two colours were used in each scheme, with the challenge text being foreground. 
(b) Letters A-Z and their pixel counts. (‘J’ and ‘L’ had the same pixel count; so were ‘K’ 
and ‘O’, and ‘P’ and ‘V’.) 
(c) Color filling segmentation. On the left is an original image, and on the right the 
segmented image. 
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We showed in [9] that the random_shearing distortion provided all the four schemes a 
resistance level ranging from reasonable to excellent in terms of being decoded by one of 
the best commercial OCR products in the market. However, for all the schemes, we could 
recognise for most of the time all characters embedded in a challenge, by exploiting 
critical design flaws we identified in each scheme.  
 
A critical vulnerability we identified in all these schemes is that although a character was 
distorted into a different shape each time, it (almost always) consisted of a constant 
number of foreground pixels. That is, each character most of the time had a constant pixel 
count in all challenges generated. Furthermore, most of the characters had a distinct pixel 
count. For example, Figure 1(b) plots the pixel count of letters A-Z, i.e., the alphabet set 
used by both the word_image and random_letters_image schemes. 
 
The second critical vulnerability we identified is that we could use a simple method to 
identify each character in a challenge image in the right order, that is, to properly 
segment the image into individual characters. The basic idea is: few characters connected 
with each other in the target schemes, and therefore we could separate the characters by 
detecting every connected component in a challenge image.  
 
Our segmentation method works as follows. Only two colours were used in each 
challenge, with the challenge text being the foreground colour. Therefore, first, we detect 
a foreground pixel, and then trace all its foreground neighbours until all pixels in this 
connected component are traversed. Next, the algorithm locates a foreground pixel 
outside of the area of the detected component(s), and starts another traversal process to 
identify a next component. This process continues until all connected component in the 
challenge are located.  
 
This algorithm is effectively like using a distinct colour to flood each character, so we 
call it a method of “colour filling segmentation”. Figure 1(c) shows the result of 
applying the CFS method to a challenge, where the number of colours used to fill the 
image is the number of characters in the image.  
 
Based on the above two observations, our attack is as follows.  
1. Build a character–pixel count lookup table for the alphabet set used in a scheme.  
2. Remove small noise dots, if any, in a challenge image - they were easily 
distinguishable as they had a pixel count much smaller than any legitimate 
character did. 
3. Divide the challenge into multiple segments with the CFS method.  
4. Count the number of foreground pixels in each segment; 
5. Look up the pixel count table to identify each candidate character. If a pixel count 
cannot be located in the table, it is very likely that the corresponding segment was 
just a component of a broken character. We combine this segment with its left and 
right neighbour segments respectively, and the combination that returns a 
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meaningful result in the look-up table will be treated as a single character. When 
both combinations are plausible, we randomly choose one of them.  
6. For the characters with identical pixel counts such as ‘J’ and ‘L’, ‘K’ and ‘O’, and 
‘P’ and ‘V’, we tell them apart by analyzing their geometric layouts with simple 
algorithms. (The word_image scheme used an English word in each challenge. 
Therefore, spelling checking could often tell apart the characters with identical 
pixel counts). 
This simple attack has achieved almost 100% success for quickly breaking each of the 
target schemes. For example, a success rate of 98% was achieved for breaking the 
random_letters_image scheme, and it took only ~16 ms per challenge on an ordinary 
desktop computer with Pentium 2.8 GHz CPU and 512 MB memory.  
 
4 Microsoft CAPTCHA: Arcs and characters were distinguishable  
 
Microsoft first deployed their CAPTCHA in Hotmail’s user registration system in 2002 
[7]. Ever since, this scheme has undergone extensive improvement in terms of both 
robustness and usability [2]. It has been deployed in many of Microsoft’s online services 
including Hotmail, MSN and Windows Live for years. 
 
Designed to be segmentation resistant, this scheme was a collaborative effort of an 
interdisciplinary team of diverse expertise in Microsoft including document processing 
and understanding, machine learning, HCI and security specialists. In fact, the widely 
accepted “segmentation resistance” principle and the commonly accepted robustness 
criteria were established by this team.  
 
Fig 2(a) shows some example challenges generated by this Microsoft CAPTCHA.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig 2. Microsoft CAPTCHA.  (a) Four example challenges.  
(b) A successful segmentation attack. Step !: vertical segmentation, which divides a pre-
processed image into chunks with the help of a histogram. Step ": color filling 
segmentation, which identifies separate objects in each chunk. Step #: arc removal, where 
relative position checking plays a major role in removing arcs. After those arcs are removed, 
the histogram of the image is updated and the image is segmented more chunks. Step$:
Identifying and then segmenting remaining connected objects. In the final result, eight valid 
characters are successfully identified in the right order with each displayed in a different 
color (and most arcs are deleted). 
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The main anti-segmentation measure introduced was the addition of random arcs of 
different thicknesses, such as: 
o Non-intersecting thick arcs: these are the same color as texts in a challenge, and 
their thickness can be the same as the thick portions of characters. They do not 
directly intersect with any characters to avoid decreasing the usability of the 
scheme. 
o Intersecting thin arcs: these are the same color as texts in a challenge; their 
thickness is typically not as large as the above type of arcs, but can be the same as 
the thin portions of characters.  They intersect with thick arcs, characters or both.  
The rationale behind this design was: these arcs are themselves good candidates for false 
characters, and therefore the mix of random arcs and characters would confuse state of 
the art segmentation methods, providing strong segmentation resistance [2].  
 
A key issue for a segmentation attack on this CAPTCHA is to tell apart arcs and valid 
characters, which we achieved with a simple attack that exploited critical vulnerabilities 
in the scheme as follows.  
 
First, after some simple pre-processing including binarization, which converts a color 
challenge image to a black-white one, a standard vertical segmentation method was 
applied to segment the challenge vertically into several chunks, each of which might 
contain one or more characters. The process of vertical segmentation starts by mapping 
the image to a histogram that represents the number of foreground pixels per column in 
the image. Then, vertical segmentation lines separate the image into chunks by cutting 
through columns that have no foreground pixels at all. Step ! in Fig 2(b) illustrates this 
process, where a challenge is divided into two chunks. 
 
Then, shown as Step " in Fig 2(b), CFS was applied to identify all the connected 
components in each chunk, which we call objects and can be an arc, character, connected 
arcs, or connected characters. 
 
We observed that the relative positions of objects in a chunk could tell arcs and real 
characters apart with a high success rate. For example, typically characters were closer to 
the baseline (i.e. the horizontal central of a chunk) whereas arcs were closer to the top or 
bottom image borders. In addition, characters are horizontally juxtaposed, but never 
vertically. Based on these observations, we identified typical relative position patterns 
that could pinpoint which object was an arc in a chunk. An incomplete list of the patterns 
we identified is illustrated with real examples in Table 1. 
 
This method of examining the relative position of objects, as shown as Step # in Fig 2(b), 
identified and removed most arcs in the challenge. 
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Table 1. Typical relative position patterns  
Relative position patterns 
Layout Description Example 
Decision 
 
O1 O2 
O3 
 
Three objects in a chunk: two objects 
more or less align along the baseline, 
the 3rd object under either of them  
O3 is arc  
and can be 
removed 
O3 
O1 O2 
 
Three objects in a chunk: two objects 
more or less align along the baseline, 
the 3rd object on top of either of them  
O3 is arc  
and can be 
removed 
 
O1 O2 O3 
O4 
 
Four objects in a chunk: Three objects 
more or less align along the baseline, 
the 4th object under any of them  
O4 is arc 
and can be 
removed  
 
O1 
O2  O3 
O4 
 
Four objects in a chunk: Two objects 
more or less align along the baseline, 
the 3
rd
 and 4th objects under and on top 
any of them respectively 
 
O1 and O4 are arcs 
and can be 
removed 
O1 
O2 
Two objects in a chunk: vertically 
juxtaposed
 
 or  
 
The object that is 
less aligned with 
the baseline is 
removed as an arc. 
 
Other vulnerabilities in this CAPTCHA made it possible for us to guess with a high 
success rate which object contained connected characters and how many such characters 
there were, and to segment the connected characters properly. The details can be found in 
[10], but step $ in Fig 2(b) gives an example of the final segmentation results.   
 
Overall, our segmentation attack achieved a success rate of higher than 90% on this 
Microsoft CAPTCHA (as deployed in the summer of 2007)
1
, and we estimated that this 
scheme could be broken with an overall (segmentation and then recognition) success rate 
of over 60% (! .9 * .95^8; the individual character recognition rate was about 95% and 
the text length in this scheme was always 8 [10]). We also found that this attack could be 
effectively extended to achieve a success rate of about 77% for segmenting a Yahoo 
CAPTCHA (that had been deployed until March, 2008), leading to an overall success rate 
of about 60% for breaking this scheme (see [10] for the details). 
 
                                                 
1 The work was done in the summer of 2007. We notified Microsoft the weakness of their CAPTCHA in 
Sept, 2007. Responding to their request, we held this attack confidential until April 10, 2008. To the best of 
our knowledge this is the first effective segmentation attack on their scheme.  
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5 Google CAPTCHA: vulnerable to color filling segmentation 
 
Google have also been deploying a CAPTCHA to protect their online services. Fig 3(a) 
shows some example challenges generated by this scheme. The segmentation resistance 
mechanism used in this CAPTCHA is the so-called “crowding characters together” 
method, i.e. letting characters touch or overlap with each other. 
 
However, we correctly segmented 12 out of 100 random samples that we collected 
between December 2007 and February 2008, using the color filling segmentation alone. 
Fig 3(b) shows an example that was vulnerable to such an attack. Since the average text 
length was 6.25, this could lead to an overall success rate of 8.7% (! .12 * .95^6.25) for 
breaking this scheme.  
                
(a) 
(b) 
 
Fig 3. Google CAPTCHA.  
(a) Example challenges. (b) A challenge that was vulnerable to the CFS attack.   
 
6 Yahoo CAPTCHA: the number of characters and the text length was correlated 
 
Yahoo started to adopt CAPTCHA technology in 2000, being one of the earliest major 
organisations to do so. Since then, Yahoo have upgraded their CAPTCHAs a number of 
times. In March 2008, Yahoo rolled out a new version, in which additional effort was put 
into making it segmentation resistant. As shown in Fig 4(a), challenge texts in this 
version were compacted, and characters usually connected - they either touch with each 
other, or were connected by intersecting random lines. However, just one week after its 
deployment, we discovered some critical flaws in this CAPTCHA that could be exploited 
for a successful attack.  
       
(a) 
 
    
 
(b)      (c) 
Fig 4. Yahoo’s March 2008 scheme (a) original challenges;  
(b) an example of regular segmentation; (c) an example of angular segmentation 
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The key vulnerability is the following. In this Yahoo CAPTCHA, the length of text 
embedded in a challenge varied often, and was apparently not predictable. This is a good 
design feature, since it is harder or even impossible for an automated attack to segment a 
challenge if the number of characters in the challenge is unknown. However, we 
discovered that the number of characters in a challenge could be estimated with a high 
success rate (74% for a sample set, and 68.5% for the test set we used) by measuring the 
width of the text in the challenge.  
 
We observed that two main types of challenges were generated by this CAPTCHA, and 
they could be differentiated by a simple program. As shown in Fig 6, one type employed 
a transformation that shifts character pixels by an angle while maintaining the shapes of 
the characters. In spirit, this transformation is similar to change characters from a regular 
shape to the italic form, but to an opposite direction. We call this type angular challenge. 
The other type did not undergo such a transformation, and we call them regular 
challenges.  
 
We designed the following two simple segmentation algorithms to deal with each type of 
challenges, respectively.  
 
Segmentation of regular challenges. After pre-processing steps such as binarization, 
color filling segmentation and arc removal, the number of characters in a challenge, 
denoted by n, is directly estimated using the width of text. If there is only a single 
connected component, i.e. an object in the challenge, the object will be evenly and 
vertically cut into n chunks, each being a segment. If there are two or more objects, the 
relative size of these objects will be used to estimate the number of characters in each 
object, denoted by ni. For example, if a challenge is estimated to contain 5 characters and 
there are two objects in the challenge, then our algorithm will determine that the object 
with a larger width contains 3 characters, and the other 2 characters. Next, object i is 
evenly and vertically divided into ni chunks, each being a segment.  
 
Fig 4(b) shows an example, where it was correctly estimated that there were six 
characters in the challenge, and our algorithm simply divided the challenge text vertically 
into six even segments, each turning out to exactly contain a single character. 
 
Segmentation of angular challenges. After pre-processing, we first project a challenge 
at an angle to the vertical of 33.5 degrees - we observed that the angle used for the 
angular transformation was almost always the same - to create a histogram that represents 
the number of foreground pixels per projecting line in the image. Then, we use the span 
(i.e. length) of the histogram to estimate n, the number of characters in the challenge. 
(Here, we did not use the width of the challenge text measured from its left-most 
foreground pixel to the right-most one, since it would be less accurate.) Next, we divide 
the histogram into n even chunks, which give us n+1 boundary points in the X-axis. 
Starting with each of the points, we draw a line at an angle of 56.5 degrees to the 
horizontal line to cut the challenge image into n segments, each being supposed to 
contain a single character. Fig 4(c) gives an example showing that the angular 
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segmentation method correctly estimated the number of characters in the sample and 
successfully segmented them.  
 
Using the above two segmentation algorithms with associated rules to identify which 
algorithm to use, we achieved a segmentation success rate of around 33.4% on this 
Yahoo scheme. As a result, we estimate that this scheme can be broken with an overall 
success rate of 25.9% (! .334*.95^5; the average text length in this scheme was 5).  
 
7 Concluding Remarks  
 
We have demonstrated that a number of recent CAPTCHAs (including some high-profile 
ones) that were deployed from 2006 to 2008 could be broken with a success rate much 
higher than the widely accepted design goal for their strength. As a consequence of our 
work, captchaservice.org ceased to offer their service, and Microsoft, Yahoo and Google 
all changed their CAPTCHA design.  
 
Unlike early work on the robustness of CAPTCHAs, our attacks did not rely on 
sophisticated, specialised algorithms. Instead, we rely on our training in security 
engineering to identify what could go wrong with the schemes, and then design simple 
but novel methods to exploit design flaws that we discovered in each scheme.  
 
Compared to the early CAPTCHAs deployed from 2000 to 2004, the schemes we 
examined in this paper were better designed. The collective understanding of the design 
of CAPTCHAs has also increased with the passage of time. Overall, the robustness of 
CAPTCHAs deployed in the field does not seem to be fundamentally improved, however.  
 
It is in particular alarming that some attacks we developed for simplistic CAPTCHAs 
were widely applicable to CAPTCHAs that were more carefully designed by major 
companies. For example, the CFS method we used to segment multiple 
captchaservice.org schemes contributed much to our attack on CAPTCHAs designed by 
Microsoft, Yahoo and Google. The pixel count attack we discovered while studying the 
captchaservice.org schemes not only achieved a surprising success of recognising 
individual letters in many schemes, but also aided our attacks on Microsoft’s and 
Yahoo’s CAPTCHAs [10] by determining whether a particular component of a challenge 
image was a valid character or a random noise.  
 
Plausible reasons for these failures include the following. First, the robustness of 
CAPTCHA was mainly studied as problems of computer vision, document recognition 
and machine learning, due to their apparent relevance. As demonstrated in this paper, 
security engineering expertise and experience, in particular adversarial thinking skills, 
can make a unique and significant contribution to the understanding and improvement of 
CAPTCHA robustness. Unfortunately, sufficiently adequate such expertise was not in 
place when Microsoft, Yahoo, Google and others were designing their schemes. 
 
Second, robustness is just one side of the coin of CAPTCHA design, and usability is the 
other side – by definition, a CAPTCHA unusable for humans have no reason to exist. 
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Both sides often have subtle implications on each other, and it is not easy to strike the 
right balance. Therefore, designing CAPTCHAs that exhibit both good robustness and 
usability is much harder that it might appear to be. However, the current collective 
understanding of this topic is still limited.  
 
One lesson is as follows. Home brew CAPTCHAs seem to be a bad idea, just like home 
brew cryptography and security systems. The devil is in the details. It takes a lot of 
experience and skills to get the design of a CAPTCHA right, and even experienced 
designers make mistakes. Therefore, it is best to use a CAPTCHA that was carefully 
designed by highly experienced people and that was publicly and independently vetted 
before deployment. 
 
To summarize, CAPTCHA design is an interdisciplinary topic where expertise from 
multiple domains including computer vision, HCI, document recognition and processing 
can all matter. Our experience suggests that CAPTCHA will go through the same process 
of evolutionary development as cryptography, digital watermarking and the like, with an 
iterative process in which successful attacks lead to the development of more robust 
systems. In this process, security engineers will play a major role. 
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